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WILLS-LEGACIES-PRESUMPTION OF SATISFACTION OF DEBT-Petitioners,
the residuary legatees under their father's will, sought an accounting of
dividends from stocks and rents from real property belonging to them
but which had been collected by their father during his life and commingled with his own assets. The will did not state that the legacy to
petitioners was intended to be in satisfaction of claims against the estate.
To review an order of the chancellor requiring them to elect between accepting the legacy or prosecuting their claims against the estate petitioners
brought certiorari. Held, certiorari granted, order requiring election
quashed, and cause remanded. There is no presumption that a legacy to
a creditor of the estate is in satisfaction of the debt owed to him. A legacy
will operate in satisfaction of a debt only where the will indicates this
to be the intention of the testator. Lopez v. Lopez, (Fla. 1957) 96 S. (2d) 463.
The doctrine that a legacy to a creditor of the testator is presumed to
be in satisfaction of the debt appears to have originated in the case of
Talbott v. Duke of Shrewsbury. 1 The rule subsists today,2 its existence
proved almost solely by its numerous exceptions. The presumption has
always been held rebuttable, 3 but since its inception it appears to have
been more rebutted than rebuttable, and cases allowing the presumption
to stand are exceedingly rare. Since rebuttal of the presumption merely
requires a showing that the testator did not intend the legacy to operate
in discharge of the debt owed by him, 4 the courts have developed a body
of exceptions based upon various methods of ascertaining such an intent.
Thus, where the legacy is smaller than the debt5 this is considered a con-

Pree. Chan. 394, 24 Eng. Rep. 177 (1714).
4 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., §1572, p. 471 (1941).
Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394 (1897).
4 Some courts will permit a limited showing of extrinsic evidence. See Rowe v.
Strother, 341 Mo. 1149, 111 S.W. (2d) 93 (1937).
5 Strong v. Williams, 12 Mass. 391 (1815).
1
2
3
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elusive rebuttal. 6 Again, an uncertain or unliquidated claim is not held
to be satisfied by a legacy,7 and an uncertain legacy is held not to satisfy
a certain debt. 8 The presumption is rebutted where the legacy is of a
different nature,9 or where its terms differ from the debt.10 Sufficiency of
assets in the estate to pay all legacies and also to pay all debts has been
held indicative of testator's intention to give bounty.11 Since the intent
of the testator controls the operation of the presumption, a debt incurred
after the making of the will is not within the rule,12 nor is the case where
the testator in making the legacy expresses a motive other than payment
of his debt.13 A clause in the will directing the executor to pay all of the
testator's debts has been held to eliminate the presumption.14 Some courts
refuse to apply the presumption unless there is an exact coincidence between the terms of the legacy and the prior claim.15
·
The principal case walks an old path with new shoes. By accepting the
"modem rule," which does away with the presumption, it abandons
verbal obedience to the "general rule" in favor of reason.16 Although it
would appear to be a much more rational approach to the problem,
the modem rule has found only limited acceptance.17 Unfortunately, after
6 A legacy smaller than the debt is not considered a "pro tanto" satisfaction. See
Allen v. Etter, 92 Ind. App. 297, 175 N.E. 286 (1931). But see In re Estate of Cooke, 207
Minn. 437,292 N.W. 96 (1940).
7Witt v. Witt, 105 Ind. App. 415, 12 N.E. (2d) 1013 (1938).
s Will of Shirley, 207 Wis. 549, 242 N.W. 207 (1932).
9 Turner v. White, 329 Mass. 549, 109 N.E. (2d) 155 (1952).
10 McMillan v. Massie's Executor, 233 Ky. 808, 27 S.W. (2d) 416 (1929).
11 Spangler's Estate, 65 York Leg. Rec. (Pa.) 193 (1952).
12 In re Jewuske's Estate, 85 N.Y.S. (2d) 476 (1948).
13 In re Estate of Holta, 246 Iowa 527, 68 N.W. (2d) 314 (1955); In re Huether's Will,
106 N.Y.S. (2d) 272 (1951).
14Rouse v. Rouse, 238 N.C. 568, 78 S;E. (2d) 451 (1953).
15 In re Latz's Estate, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 584 (1950); Merrill v. Dustman, 97 Cal. App.
(2d) 473, 217 P. (2d) 998 (1950). For more detail on the exceptions to the presumption of
satisfaction, see 86 A.L.R. 6 (1932); 47 A.L.R. (2d) 1140 (1955). Courts have been less
hesitant about applying the presumption in cases where there was an understanding that
certain claims were to be satisfied by will. In this type of case the testator's actual intent
will usually be in line with the presumption, making its application reasonable. However,
the presumption remains rebuttable. See Estate of Cooke, note 6 supra, noted in 25 MINN.
L. REv. 122 (1940).
16 "The rule itself is not founded in reason, and often tends to defeat the bounty
of testators, and able chancellors have thought it more agreeable to equity, to construe
a testator to be both just and generous, where the interests of third persons are nol
affected. And courts of justice will now lay hold of slight circmnstances to get rid of the
rule." Byrne v. Byrne, 3 Serg. &: R. (Pa.) •54 at •50 (1817).
17 The opinion of the principal case at 466 quotes ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., §138
(1953) as authority for the "modern rule." However, the citations given by Atkinson in
support of this rule do not appear to be very strong. In Wilson v. Safe Deposit 8: T. Co.,
183 Md. 245, 37 A. (2d) 321 (1944), the issue is handled by applying a rule against
requiring an election by the legatee-claimant which, in effect, amounts to a contrary
presumption, though on a different level. Rizzo v. Cunningham, 303 Mass. 16, 20 N.E. (2d)
471 (1939), and Matter of Card, 145 Misc. 686, 260 N.Y.S. 764 (1932), at least partially base
their .holdings on case authority which had applied exceptions to the old rule. But see
White v. Deering, 38 Cal. App. 433, 177 P. 516 (1918).
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courageously adopting the new rule the principal case weakens itself as
authority for the modern approach by fitting its factual situation under
several of the well-recognized exceptions to the old rule. It is to be hoped
that for greater clarity in achieving the same result courts will more
and more tend to favor the modern rule18 and discard the presumption
which for generations has unnecessarily obscured the law in this area.

Harry D. Krause, S.Ed.

18 Recent cases ignoring the presumption are Matter of Runyon, 201 Misc. 464, 105
N.Y.S. (2d) 118 (1951); Hollister v. Old Colony Trust Co., 328 Mass. 225, 102 N.E. (2d)
770 (1952); Matter of Herb, 163 Misc. 441, 296 N.Y.S. 491 (1937).

